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LAPSE AND VESTING OF INTEREST
REVISITED
Leonard Levin*
INTRODUCTION

When a legatee dies before the testator it is "horn book law"
that, subject to certain exceptions discussed herein, the legacy fails
and is deemed to lapse.1 Alternatively, if a settlor creates a trust in
which he creates an income interest first and then provides for the
distribution to a beneficiary on the termination of the income interest, the presumption is that the beneficiary who is to receive the distribution on termination of the income interest need not survive the
time of distribution.2 Should such beneficiary die after the testator,
but before the prior interest expires, his interest presumptively becomes part of his estate and thus passes to the beneficiary's distributees. It is the thesis of this article that these two fact situations raise
similar issues of construction and should be decided on the basis of a
common set of rules because the difference in treatment is no more
than an accident of history.
Initially, it might be noted that the problem under consideration
is one of many difficult litigation questions arising from a failure of
the testator or settlor to deal specifically with a situation which has
actually occurred and the resulting struggle that courts and legislatures have had in attempting to supply the testator's missing intent
for that situation. It is perhaps understandable that the results, if not
unpredictable, are predicated on relatively arbitrary principles which
are seldom subject to the scrutiny of reasoned analysis. An examination of the problem must begin with a brief overview of the law of
lapse and of the vesting of future interests, respectively.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 1948, Wharton School,

University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1950, Magna Cum Laude, University of Pennsylvania School
of Law.
I. See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953).
2. See generally L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 154 (2d ed.
1956).
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LAPSE

The Basic Concept

A testator can easily and specifically address the possibility that
a beneficiary could die before he would. On the one hand, he can
provide that if a designated donee in his will fails to survive him, an
alternate person will take in his place. In the alternative, he can provide that the gift for such beneficiary shall be void. In the absence of
such a provision, the starting point of the law was to treat any interest created for a beneficiary who failed to survive the testator as
void. Such interest was said to have lapsed.' Thus, the gift did not
pass to the beneficiary's estate or his successors. If the gift were
other than a residuary one and not a class gift," it went into the
residue. If it were a residuary gift in which the sole beneficiary predeceased the testator, an intestacy resulted. 5 When there were several residuary beneficiaries, courts were not entirely in agreement.
The traditional point of view was still to have a partial intestacy'
unless the gift was a class gift. 7 However, a number of jurisdictions
have altered the rule to avoid an intestacy by implying a gift of the
lapsed interest in intestacy in pro rated portions to the other residuary beneficiaries. 8 If the gift were a class gift, even if treated as lapsing on death of a member of the class, the foregoing rules did not
apply. Instead, the gift passed to the surviving members of the class.9
Moreover, the lapse occurred even where the testator did not require
that the beneficiary survive him under the express terms of the will.
This contrasts sharply with the rule governing vesting of future interests considered subsequently.
The concept of lapse has been largely accepted with little analy3. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 777 (gifts tend to lapse unless saved by
appropriate testamentary or statutory provisions).
4. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text for a general discussion of lapse and
class gifts.
5. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note I, at 784.
6. Sands v. Roth, 41 Ohio Op.38, 89 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio P. Ct. 1949).
7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. In re Nielsen's Will, 256 Wis. 521, 41 N.W.2d 369 (1950); Commerce Nat'i Bank v.
Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952); see also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514(1 1)
(1988) (an implied gift to other residuary beneficiaries is directed in Pennsylvania by its probate code).
9. See, e.g., Cates v. Bush, 295 Ala. 256, 326 So. 2d 742 (1976); In re Estate of Blacksill, 124 Ariz. 130, 602 P.2d 511(1979); Scholem v. Long, 256 Ark. 786, 439 S.W.2d 929
(1969); In re Estate of Clarke, 460 Pa. 41, 331 A.2d 408 (1975). Many of these cases litigated
the question of whether a gift to persons who are in fact named, can be regarded in context as
a class gift for the purposes of this rule. The results of this question are not always predictable.
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sis of why the death of a beneficiary before the testator should produce such an outcome. It is possible that this lapse was simply a
carry-over from the established principle that inheritance is for the
living and that an estate is not a legal entity. Thus, an attempt to
make a transfer to a nonexistent entity is void. This should be true
whether the designated beneficiary was dead when the will was executed, or died afterward but before the date of the testator's death
since the will is only operative upon such death. 10 Although not entirely consistent with the above thought, in a few cases there have
occasionally been intimations suggesting that the failure of the interest through lapse arises from the presumed intention of the testator." The concept of lapse is firmly established, and therefore, that
there would seldom be any difference between these analyses. The
exception would occur in a rare instance in which the testator specifically names the estate of his designated beneficiary as an alternate
beneficiary. In the few reported cases in which this has occurred, as
might be expected, courts have not been in agreement."2
B.

Modern Modifications of Lapse

The rule requiring a lapse has been substantially modified by
modern courts and legislatures. By preventing a lapse, such modifications have not necessarily increased the likelihood that the resultant disposition would be closer to a testator's probable intention. Of
course, if a legacy or devise was not a gift but simply was the performance of a contractual obligation entered into by the testator, the
obligation would survive his death. Therefore, there would be no reason why the legacy or devise should not also survive and the doctrine
of lapse would be deemed inapplicable. 13 However, there have been a
few cases in which non-lapse has been a result in which, arguably, its
application tends to defeat, rather than further, the probable intention of the testator. Thus, two persons may, by contract, mutually
agree on a testamentary provision for the survivor and may further
10. Cf. In re Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968)
(a gift to a dog was regarded as void because a dog is not a legal entity).
II. See, e.g., In re Estate of Griffen, 86 Wash. 2d 223, 543 P.2d 245 (1975); In re
Conklin's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
12. Compare In re Glass' Estate, 164 Cal. 765, 130 P. 868 (1913) (holding gift to an
estate was void for want of a donee) with In re Estate of Braman, 435 Pa. 573, 258 A.2d 492
(1969) (sustaining such a gift). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 27.1 comment c (1988) (arguing that such a gift should be given effect).
13. See 57 AM. JUR. 958 Wills § 1427 (1948); see also McNeal v. Pierce, 73 Ohio St. 7.
75 N.E. 938 (1905).
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agree that such survivor will not revoke his or her will following the
death of the first. Such disposition would be common in the estate
plans of married persons. When one of the designated beneficiaries
of the contract dies before the survivor, the prevailing view has been
that the interest created for him does not lapse even though such
beneficiary has predeceased the settlor. This is because the beneficiary acquires an irrevocable contract claim, as a third party beneficiary, against the estate of the testator. Even if the estate of such
deceased beneficiary were to pass to persons to whom the original
testator would not have wished the property to pass, courts have per14
mitted the gift to pass as a part of the estate of such beneficiary.
This principle was expanded in In re Conklin's Estate. 6 The
testatrix, a widow, recited that the gift was made to a beneficiary
because of an unpaid debt due from her deceased husband. This debt
had not been paid at her husband's death because of the absence of
funds in the estate. The court concluded that the gift did not lapse
because of the recital that the gift was to satisfy a moral obligation,
which made the case no different than if the gift were to satisfy a
legal obligation. Hence, the death of the beneficiary did not cause
the gift to fail. It did not appear in the decision who was the recipient of the estate of the beneficiary, although this would seem to have
been an important consideration in any speculation of the probable
intention of the testator.
Some courts have avoided lapse by reading a contrary intention
into the will; In re Estate of Griffen is illustrative.' In that case, the
testatrix had given the residue of her estate to her stepdaughter. The
stepdaughter died intestate and was survived by an adopted daughter
to whom the testatrix had been close. The heirs at law who were all
collaterals had been excluded from the will. In a prior provision of
the will, a gift to a friend had been expressly conditioned on her
survival. No such language appeared in the residuary gift which was
expressed to the adopted daughter "and her heirs." Ordinarily, the
language "and her heirs" would have been construed as simply the
technical language necessary for an estate of inheritance. The court,
nevertheless, construed the language as indicating an intention that
14. See Rauch v. Rauch, 112 III. App. 3d 198, 445 N.E.2d 77 (1983). The rule has,
however, been subject to substantial criticism. See Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323, 397 (1988) (arguing that the rule should not be aPplied automatically to save every legacy when the legatee dies).
15. 131 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
16. 86 Wash. 2d 223, 543 P.2d 245 (1975).
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the gift did not lapse, but rather passed to the adopted daughter of
the legatee. It is, however, unclear whether the court was reading in
an alternate gift by implication or whether the gift passed to the
legatee's estate and then to the heirs of such legatee as a part of the
legatee's estate. Since the residuary legatee died intestate, it was unnecessary for the court to make the point clear. If the recipient of
the beneficiary is a spouse of a child of the original beneficiary, as a
matter of a surmise of the testator's intention, it is easier to justify
the decision on grounds similar to the grounds used to justify the
decision in In re Estate of Griffen.
On the other hand, courts are not always consistent. For example, suppose a testator, under the terms of his will, creates a general
power of appointment in a donee and the donee dies before the testator. Further suppose that the donee leaves a will which, except for
the order of their deaths, would have been effective to exercise the
power conferred. Certainly permitting the testator's gift to pass in
accordance with the wishes of the donee does no violence to the
avowed intention of the testator. Nevertheless, the traditional view
would be that since the alleged donee died before the donor, the
power as a right created in the donor's will, would lapse and the
17
attempted exercise by the donee would be totally ineffective.
C.

Application to the Class Gift

A separate problem concerns the class gift and the failure of a
member of the class to survive the testator. Logically, if the prospective member of the class had died before the will was executed, the
designation could not have been intended to include him and no real
problem of lapse is involved. 8 On the other hand, if the prospective
member of the class dies between the time that the will was executed
and the time of the death of the testator, conflicting analogies are
possible. It might be possible to say that since the class is to be read
17. Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910). But cf. In re Fowles' Will, 222
N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918). In this case, the donor and donee were killed in a common
disaster and there was no evidence as to who had survived. The court gave effect to a provision
in the donor's will that the donee should be presumed to survive him if they did die in a
common disaster and also gave effect to the terms of the donee's will. Such a result might have
been reached by treating the donee's disposition as an act of independent significance from the
donor's will, but the court did not use this rationale to justify the outcome. Id.
18. See Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473 (Fla. App. 1959); Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass.
415, 29 N.E. 631 (1892); In re Harrison's Estate, 202 Pa. 331, 51 A. 976 (1902). Nevertheless,
some states have applied their anti-lapse statutes to this type of case when such statutes have
been held applicable to class gifts. See also Kehl v. Taylor, 275 Ill. 346, 114 N.E. 125 (1916);
Sloan v. Thornton, 102 Ky. 443, 43 S.W. 415 (1897).
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as including only persons qualifying at the time of the testator's
death, one who does not survive is excluded as a designated beneficiary. On the other hand, it is possible to treat this as a type of lapse
even though the actual benefit passes to the other surviving members
of the class. In the absence of a valid statute providing for a substitutionary gift, whether language of lapse is employed or not, it seems
clear that the effect of such death is not to enlarge the residue nor to
create an intestacy. Instead, the effect is to enlarge the shares of the
remaining class members on a prorated basis. 19 Thus, in most cases
the question of whether or not there is a lapse is largely a matter of
semantics. However, it should be noted that the question may be
important in determining whether an anti-lapse statute should apply
20
to a class gift.
D. Statutory Modifications
Two statutory changes in the rules of lapse are common. Both
appear to constitute an effort by the legislature to join the judiciary
in speculating about the probable intention of a testator whose will is
silent on the subject. One has expanded the concept of lapse and the
other has limited its application.
In expanding the doctrine, most states have provisions covering
the possibility of a simultaneous death, particularly in a common disaster. Under the terms of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,
which most states have adopted, 21 the successors of a deceased beneficiary who wish to receive the gift of their predecessor have the burden of proving that such beneficiary survived the testator. Absent
such proof there is a presumption of a lapse. Moreover, the Uniform
Probate Code and those states adopting it in whole or in part have
imposed a requirement that the beneficiary survive the testator by a
significant period of time (designated in the Uniform Probate Code
as 120 hours) in order to take.22 This has been said to be designed in
order to avoid the expense of having the same assets pass through
more than one estate. 3
A second modification, which purports to limit the application
19.
266, 69
20.
21.
dictions
22.
23.

In re Murphy's Estate, 157 Cal. 63, 106 P. 230 (1909); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 207 Ill.
N.E. 834 (1904); In re King's Estate, 200 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E. 484 (1910).
See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 18a U.L.A. § 141 (1990 Supp.) for a listing of jurisadopting the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
Id. at § 2-601.
See id. at § 2-104.
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of the doctrine of lapse, consists of a common statutory provision
permitting close successors in interest of a beneficiary to succeed to
such beneficiary's gift. It is difficult to generalize because the statutes substantially differ."' Most limit their application to beneficiaries who are sufficiently closely related to the testator by blood
such as children, brothers and sisters, etc. Additionally, most limit
the successors of the decedent who may benefit from the statute to
close relatives of the beneficiary such as children or other issue. Although such statutes are loosely designated as "anti-lapse statutes"
the designation is a misnomer since such statutes do not place the
gift in the estate of the beneficiary, but create a direct substitutionary gift in a close relative of the originally designated deceased
beneficiary.2 5
Numerous constructional problems have arisen with regard to
anti-lapse statutes. This is particularly true when they have not been
carefully designed.2 6 Although most anti-lapse statutes do not apply
if it can be established that the testator has expressed a contrary
intention, there is considerable difficulty in determining what constitutes a showing of such intention. For example, is it sufficient that
the testator imposes a requirement that a beneficiary be a "survivor"
to avoid the application of the statute?2 7 Is it sufficient to establish
that the testator desired to treat a given class equally which intention would be defeated by the application of the statute?28 Would it
be sufficient to establish that the testator expressed an intention to
disinherit a person who would be an alternate beneficiary under such
a statute?2 9 Undoubtedly in the interests of certainty, many courts
have mechanically applied their "anti-lapse statutes" in a fashion
which would seem to be at variance with what common experience
24. See Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J. 324
(1988) (summarizing various types of anti-lapse statutes); see also French, Antilapse Statutes
Are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1985).
25. Id.
26. See Roberts, supra note 24 for an informative treatment of these constructional
problems; see also French, supra note 24 (critiquing the workability of such statutes).
27. See Schneller v. Schneller, 356 Ill. 89, 190 N.E. 121 (1934) (applying anti-lapse
statute). Compare Kunkel v. Kunkel, 267 Pa. 163, 110 A. 73 (1920) (anti-lapse statute not
applicable) with Gale v. Keyes, 45 Ohio App. 61, 186 N.E. 755 (1933) (applying anti-lapse
statute).
28. See French, supra note 24, at 340.
29. Most cases in which this problem has arisen have given a negative answer to this
question. See Murray v. Murray, 564 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1978); In re Estate of Sellers, 344 Pa.
538, 496 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).

162
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would tell us the testator would have probably intended.30
One common construction problem relates to the application of
the statute to class gifts.3 " Some statutes eliminate this problem altogether by anticipating it and specifically making the statute apply to
class gifts. 3 2 Such language has been held to be inclusive enough to
permit descendants of those dying before the testator executed the
will to share in the gift.33 If no specific provision has been made, the
outcome is likely to be unpredictable.3 4 An outcome is most likely to
be influenced by whether the court views the death of one member of
the class in the lifetime of the testator as a lapse or simply as an
inability to qualify as a member of the class as previously discussed.
III.

VESTING OF FUTURE INTERESTS

A. Distinguishedfrom Lapse
When the beneficiary of a trust fails to survive a prior interest
under the trust, an entirely different set of legal principles is involved. In this situation the future interest in the modern trust is
analogized to the historic future interest in real estate. The principles and concepts developed in this context tend to be applied more
or less uncritically, except to the extent modified by the legislature.
More specifically, the simplest form of the problem exists when a
testator provides for a remainder interest following the death of a
life income beneficiary. For example, assume that the testator created a trust to provide income for his widow for life and upon her
death he created a remainder interest for his son. If the son were to
die before the testator, the problem is one of lapse under the principles previously discussed. Suppose, however, that the son survives the
30. See generally French, supra note 24, at 359-61.
31. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 782.
32. Statutes so provide in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Maryland, Tennessee, Virginia and
West Virginia. See generally T. ATKINSON supra note 1, at 782. Even in the absense of such
specific statutory language, most states hold that anti-lapse statutes do in fact apply to class
gifts.
33. Hoverstad v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 76 S.D. 119, 74 N.W.2d 48 (1955). But
cf. White v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 171 Mass. 84, 50 N.E. 512 (1898); Pimel v.
Betjemann, 183 N.Y. 194, 76 N.E. 157 (1905) (refusing to apply anti-lapse statutes in such a
case).
34. See T. ATKINSON, supra note I, at 782. Compare Johns v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
206 Ga. 313, 57 S.E. 2d 182 (1950) and Stahl v. Emery 147 Md. 123, 127 A. 760 (1925)
(both cases deny applicability of anti-lapse statutes to class gifts) with Hoverstad v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co, 76 S.D. 119, 74 N.W.2d 48 (which applies an anti-lapse statute even in the
absence of an express provision). The modern trend seems to be to make the anti-lapse statutes
applicable.
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testator but dies during the lifetime of the life tenant. Should his
interest fail in the same way it would have had he died during the
testator's lifetime? On principle it is difficult to distinguish the two
cases. Nevertheless, under the rubric that the law "favors vesting at
the earliest possible time" the presumption would be that the son
had a "vested interest" which would not be conditioned upon his survival of the income interest under the trust.3 5
B.

Historic Basis for the Presumption of Vesting

During an earlier period when most future interests were legal
interests in real estate, an interest would have to be vested to be
alienable. Such a rule of construction served a valid purpose in promoting free alienability.3 6 However, the reason for the rule no longer
exists because most future interests are in property held by a trustee
with full power to alienate. Additionally, most future interests
3
whether vested or not are treated as alienable. 7
C.

Consequence of Vested Construction

Nevertheless, the effect of treating the ultimate right to the
principal of the trust as vested is substantial. Thus, such an interest
could be sold or given away during the lifetime of the life tenant
(absent a valid enforceable spendthrift provision). So too, upon the
death of the holder of such interest it would be an asset disposable as
a part of the estate of the owner of such future interest.3 8 Of course
the testator could avoid this construction by making it clear that he
required that the beneficiary survive to the time of enjoyment. Thus,
if he were to condition the remainder interest on the remainderman
being alive when the life interest terminated, the interest would be a
contingent remainder and would not be subject to the above rule.3 9
Traditional courts struggle with such a construction even to the point
of reaching an outcome which seems contrary to common sense.
In one early case, a testator, following a life estate for one
35. L. SIMES & F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 91, at 188 (2d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter SIMES]; Cf., In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971) which
applied the rules of lapse and the anti-lapse statute to a revocable inter vivos trust in which the
settlor had retained a life interest. The court reasoned that in this limited context there was no
substantial distinction between such a trust and a testamentary disposition. Id.
36. SIMES, supra note 35, at § 90.
37. Id. at § 33.
38. Greer v. Parker, 209 Ark. 553, 191 S.W.2d 584 (1946); Gaffney v. Shepard, 108
Conn. 339, 143 A. 236 (1928).
39. See SIMES, supra note 35, at §33.
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named child, gave the remainder "to the named child's surviving
children." 40 The court, in accordance with the presumption in favor
of vesting, construed the lahguage "surviving" as referring to surviving the testator. The court concluded that the interest was vested, so
that each of his grandchildren who were alive at the testator's death
took a vested interest, regardless of whether or not he was alive at
the actual time of distribution. Thus, the ultimate beneficiaries of
the testator's trust could be persons whom the testator not only did
not intend, but of whom he was totally unaware. Additionally, in a
case where a testator, following a life interest, directed a distribution
to Y or his surviving children, it was held that when Y survived the
life tenant he took a full interest. This was true even though Y died
before the life tenant. Thus, the designated children of Y took no
interest at all.4 1
The same principle has been held to apply even when the persons designated for the remainder interest were also within the class
of life income beneficiaries. Thus, when a testator created a trust to
provide income for two unmarried sisters and provided that upon the
death of the surviving sister the property should be divided among
his brothers and sisters, the gift was presumed vested. Thus, distributees of the estates of the life tenants shared in the remainder interest."2 So too, suppose a testator were to create a trust for his wife for
life and then direct distribution "to his heirs at law." Even if the
court did not apply the doctrine of worthier title to create a reversionary right, nevertheless a modern jurisdiction might treat a surviving spouse as an intestate heir. If this were so, and the term
"heirs" was to mean the person's surviving the decedent, the ultimate distribution might be the heirs of the spouse rather than the
3
intended heirs of the decedent.4

D. Application to Gifts Payable on Future Events
The problem may also arise when the testator delays the distribution to a beneficiary to a point subsequent in time, such as his
arriving at a certain age, his marriage, etc. Under these circumstances, the question has been posed in terms of whether the described event is a condition of the gift or a mere description of when
a gift which has already been made and is vested, is to be paid or to
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ross v. Drake, 37 Pa. 373 (1861).
In re Weir's Estate, 307 Pa. 461, 161 A. 730 (1932).
Security Trust Co. v. Irvine, 33 Del. Ch. 375, 93 A.2d 528 (1953).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § .2514 (Purdon 1975).
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be distributed." The case law in this area is obtuse, difficult to follow and frequently based upon relatively arbitrary distinctions. 45
Some courts have even based their decisions on early Roman Law,
which had been the original basis for distribution of personalty. On
this basis a distinction was made between a gift to A when he
reaches twenty-one, which would be deemed contingent upon his
reaching such age, and a gift "to be paid to A when he reaches
twenty-one," which would be deemed vested and distributable as a
part of A's estate even if he failed to reach twenty-one.46 Similarly,
many courts engaged in circular reasoning in this sense. Since a beneficiary of a vested interest was entitled during lifetime to the income the interest produced, his interest would be deemed to be
vested for all purposes. Thus, he would be required to survive to the
time of termination of the trust when the trust could be construed as
conferring upon him a right to the income in the interim.'7 Again it
seems likely that a testator, if directly confronted with the problem,
would have intended his beneficiary only to receive the funds and
had no thought to their passing to the beneficiaries' distributees.
These individuals might not be his family at all but could be a designated charity or for that matter a designated friend whom the original testator did not even know.
E.

Application to Class Gifts

At common law, the foregoing rules were as applicable to class
gifts of a future interest as they were to gifts to individuals. Thus, a
class gift of a future interest was presumed to be vested although
subject to open.48 That is, the share of each participant was subject
to being reduced by additional members qualifying before the time
assigned for distribution of the corpus. 49 Accordingly, if a trust were
created for a testator's wife for life with a remainder to his children,
although additional children could qualify to take, any child alive
when the testator died would have an interest which would survive
44. See generally SIMES, supra note 35, § 93, at 191.
45. Id.
46. Clobberie's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (1677); see also Wardwell v. Hale, 161 Mass.
396, 37 N.E. 196 (1894) (a similar rule of construction reached by an American court).
47. Hanson v. Graham, 31 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1801); In re Parker, 16 Ch. D. 44 (1880).
48. SIMES, supra note 35, § 103, at 211.
49. This rule was subject to the "Rule of Convenience," which has been adopted generally, under which a class closes once any member of the class is entitled to an immediate
distribution of principal. See Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 50 R.I. 242, 146 A. 628 (1929);
Baylies v. Hamilton, 36 A.D. 133, 55 NY.S. 390 (1899).
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such child's death. Thus, such child could dispose of his aliquot
share either during his life or at the time of his death under the
terms of his will. 50
F.

Statutory Modifications

In a few states, the legislatures have begun to make changes in
these common law rules of construction. However, such legislation is
not as common as the anti-lapse statutes previously discussed. In
Pennsylvania, all class gifts are construed to consist of those members of the class qualifying at the time such class is to receive distribution. Furthermore, in cases in which the class is described other
than as the "heirs or next of kin" of another or words of similar
import, the issue of a deceased member of the class may receive the
share of such relative. Thus, the outcome would be much the same
as it would be in the case of an anti-lapse statute.51 A similar rule is
proposed in the new revision of the Uniform Probate Code which is
currently on the drawing board. 52 Changes such as that described
above are relatively rare and are, in any event, limited to class gifts.
As a result, many courts continue to struggle with the common law
rules of construction under which all future interests are presumed
vested in the absence of a showing of a contrary intention.
CONCLUSION AND INTEGRATION

Thus, are there any common threads which connect the problem
of lapsing and the problem of failure of a future interest because the
designee fails to survive to the time of distribution or enjoyment?
Certainly the traditional approach has been to start with opposite
presumptions. In the case of lapse, the failure of the designee to survive the testator would ordinarily lead to a failure of the interest.
Legislative efforts to modify the rule by directing a substitutionary
gift have not been entirely successful. In the case of a future interest,
absent words of survival, the death of a designee after the testator,
will not cause his interest to fail even if the time for enjoyment has
not arisen. Instead, the interest becomes a part of the designee's estate. On the other hand, any attempt to decide cases solely on the
basis of the testator's intention must be unsatisfactory. In most instances, from the fact that the will was silent, one can infer that
50.
51.
52.

See SIMES, supra note 35, § 103, at 212.
See 20 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN. § 2514 (Purdon 1975).
See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (Proposed Revision 1988).
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there was no intention.
It is submitted that the attitude taken by courts in a case in
which the legatee fails to survive the testator, is a better point for
departure than that taken by courts in determining whether or not
the owner of a future interest must survive to the time of enjoyment.
Thus, it is a fundamental incident of ownership that one should have
the power, not only to enjoy property, but to control its disposition at
death. It is, of course, true that no one can control disposition for an
indefinite period in the future. Efforts to extend the "dead hand" for
an excessive period have led to the Rule against Perpetuities and
related limitations. " Nevertheless, tradition recognizes the right of
an owner to control disposition beyond his lifetime for at least a single generation. If an interest, whether present or future, is permitted
to pass as a part of a designee's estate, control over such disposition
passes from the original donor at what seems a premature time. The
one exception is in the case of a power of appointment in which the
donor expressly manifests the intention that another have such disposition." This time of death of donee with respect to that of the donor
ought to be irrelevant. In other cases, however, it would seem inappropriate for any interest of a designee to pass as a part of such
designee's estate when he predeceases the testator. This concept has,
with the exceptions noted herein, generally been recognized in the
case of a lapse caused by a death before the testator. Parenthetically
it should be noted that under such an analysis it would seem inappropriate to apply the doctrine of lapse when the donee of a power of
appointment dies before the testator but clearly indicates how he
would have wished the property to pass.
The existence of a similar argument for future interests has not
generally been recognized. 5 While a few legislatures have expressed
the thought that the determination of membership in a class gift of a
future interest should be totally delayed until the time fixed for distribution,5 6 such legislation is not widespread and has no application
to future interests not designated to a class. This is true although the
creation of such a future interest raises a similar problem. Suppose a
testator creates a trust to provide income for his surviving spouse for
life and then directs the distribution of the corpus to his son, Sam. It
seems likely that the testator would not likely contemplate that if
53. See generally SIMES, supra note 35, § 112, at 237.
54. Id.
55. Cf. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971).
56. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514 (Purdon 1975).
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Sam died in the lifetime of his spouse Sam could pass on the interest
he was to receive to his church or, worse still, to his mistress. Of
course, the testator could have avoided this outcome by expressly requiring that Sam survive, but it does not follow that his failure to do
so should require such an outcome. As a matter of fact, much of the
complexity accompanying the construction of modern future interests has arisen when courts struggle with murky language attempting to determine whether the interest is contingent upon survival or
not. It should be noted, that except possibly in the construction of
the applicability of an anti-lapse statute, no similar problem arises in
connection with the doctrine of lapse.
It is, of course, true that from the context of a gift, whether
present or future, one can frequently draw an inference that a testator, although he did not say so, would wish the descendants of a
deceased designee to take his share. The existence of such inference
has given rise to the wide spread popularity of anti-lapse statutes.
The drafters of the proposed Uniform Probate Code have adopted a
similar rationale. Thus it provides for an implied substitutionary gift
for issue when a class gift of a future interest is created, and one of
the persons who would otherwise have been a member of the class
57
predeceases the time of distribution.
It does not follow, however, that such a substitutionary gift
should be mandated and thus woodenly applied in all cases. Many
cases can be thought of in which such an implied gift would be inappropriate. For example, suppose a testator provides a trust for the
benefit of an unmarried daughter and then provides upon her death
the property should be distributed among his other children and his
grandchildren, share and share alike. If we were to apply a substitutionary gift for the children of a child who died in the lifetime of the
life tenant, it would distort the testamentary plan by giving a double
share to the grandchildren whose parents had died. So too, if a testator had provided a gift to a trusted employee it seems speculative
that he would want the children of the employee, whom the testator
never knew, to receive the share of the designee who died. It might
be possible to formulate a complex formula for determining when a
substitutionary gift should be employed or not.. 8 However, it is suggested that this is an area where flexibility is more important than
certainty. Obviously the testator, who by definition, has not made his
57.
58.

See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (Proposed Revision 1988).
See French, supra note 24, which suggests just such a formula.
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intention clear, should not be in a position to complain about the fact
that the final outcome may not be entirely predictable.
In summary, it is suggested that a gift might survive the death
of the designee either in the lifetime of the testator or before the
time of enjoyment if the designee is the donee of a power of appointment, since by definition the testator desires to have the disposition
made by such designee. Under these circumstances, the point at
which the donee dies would seem irrelevant. A similar result should
follow when the designation is to satisfy a commercial indebtedness.
Since the debt survives the creditor's death and may be enforced by
the creditor's estate, the designation intended as a means of payment
should survive such debt. This should not apply, however, to a third
party beneficiary created through a will contract of two other persons, even though for some purposes his rights are recognizable as
contractual. In all other cases, no gift should be valid when the designee fails to survive the time of distribution.
The question of whether or not to imply a substitutionary gift
for the widow or children of a deceased designee is an entirely different one.5 9 This is a question which should best be left to the sound
discretion of the court. The criterion for making this determination
should be the court's best guess as to what the testator, were he
available to be asked, would have wanted given the nature of the
estate plan, the purpose of the gift and all of the surrounding circumstances. Since testamentary intention is frequently a matter of
speculation or surmise, such an approach introduces an element of
uncertainty. Nevertheless, it would free the courts from the artificial
restraints placed on their judgment in reaching an outcome. Such
decisions are frequently suggested by common sense and common
experience. Moreover, in the course of time, guidelines might develop incrementally out of decisional law on the subject.
Such an approach would enormously simplify this area of the
59. It should be noted that a substituted gift for a junior generation, when a beneficiary
from a more senior generation dies during the lifetime of the life tenant, could create the
possibility of a Generation Skipping Tax under I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (1990) at the maximum
estate tax rate of 55%. Since there is a $1,000,000 exclusion on the tax it will not be a factor
in relatively modest estates. In larger estates, the imposition of a Generation Skipping Tax can
be avoided if a general power of appointment is given to a member of the senior generation so
that an estate tax is levied on that generation. In the event that the reforms recommended
herein were to be adopted, it is hoped that a corresponding modification of the provisions of
the Generation Skipping Tax might also be adopted by Congress. Such a modification would
exclude from the Generation Skipping Tax cases in which a substituted gift is provided for a
member of a junior generation when the member of the senior generation fails to survive to the
appointed time of enjoyment.
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law by permitting the courts to make more realistic responses to the
difficult problem of supplying a testator's probable intention when he
has expressed none. This task should not be encumbered by rules
based on considerations which no longer have real relevancy.

